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Strawson and Prasad on Determinism and Resentment 
ON STRAWSON 
'Freedom and Resentment' is divided into six sections. The central ques-
tion of the article is stated in a variety of formulations in the sixth and the 
ninth paragraphs of Section IV (pp. 1 O~ 11 ). On analysis, the question 
separates out into three different orientations: of eventuality, of rational 
incumbency, and of possibility. To paraphrase: 
Would a belief in determinism lead us to abandon reactive attitudes 
and adopt the objective attitude? 
Should a belief in determinism lead us to abandon reactive attitudes 
and adopt the objective attitude? 
Could a belief in determinism lead us to abandon reactive attitudes 
and adopt the objective attitude? 
Strawson never entertains the question of eventuality. 1 Instead, he focuses • 
on its two prerequisites. To these, his answers are invariably in the nega-
tive, sometimes landing on the side of rational incumbency (no rational , 
reason why one should adopt the objective attitude) and sometimes on the 
side of possibility (not possible to adopt the objective attitude and sustain 
it). Strawson's argument in regard to the Question of Adoption is the 
central argument of the essay, but it is also important that we understand 
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why he raises the question and how he gives background to it by bringing 
up and elaborating on the notion of reactive attitudes. 
Sections I, II, and VI concern the on-going argument between 
compatibilist detenninists (who affirm determinism and morality) and 
incompatibilist determinists (who affirm determinism while denying mo-
rality2). Strawson reformulates these positions as optimistic determinists 
and pessimistic determinists, hinting at his own leanings on the subject. 
Strawson also briefly mentions sceptics (who neither deny nor affirm 
determinism or morality) and libertarians (who deny determinism and 
affirm morality). All four of these groups, Strawson says, claim to under-
stand what determinism is (while disagreeing about the precise defini-
tion). Strawson, on the other hand, admits to ignorance on the subject of 
the definition of determinism. 
In a quasi-dialogue, Strawson provides a capsule of the optimist/pessi-
mist disagreement. To paraphrase: 
optimist: Despite determinism, moral judgement and punishments 
are desirable because they deter and regulate. 
pessimist: Moral judgment and punishments imply guilt, which 
implies responsibility, which implies freedom, which implies the falsity 
of determinism (which we both agree is true). 
optimist: Freedom, yes, but only in the sense of freedom from 
(limitations), which does not imply the falsity of determinism. 
pessimist: No, freedom to is also necessary for responsibility. 
optimist: Okay, but freedom in the sense of deciding and intention 
is not incompatible with determinism. 
pessimist: Why does freedom in this sense justify judgements and 
punishments? 3 
optimist: [Silence] 
pessimist: You need another kind of freedom, and it will contradict 
determinism. 4 
Strawson is not satisfied with the optimist's silence and, in the end, sug-
gests that he continue the dialogue as follows: 
optimist: No, it is not a matter of freedom. I said in the beginning 
that morality is necessa ry because it is soc ially indispensable. 
pess imist: But that' s so cold . 
optimist: The web of attitudes and feelings which form an essential 
part of the moral life as we know it are such that ... 5 
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And so Strawson has the optimistic determinist saying that: (1) morality 
is possible in the face of determinism (no justification for this),6 and (2) 
it is desirable because we couldn't be human without it. Strawson says _ 
that the problem all along is that neither the optimists nor the pessimists 
(nor the sceptics) have given enough thought to the complexity of human 
morality. In Sections III and V and the first half of Section IV, Strawson 
attempts to unravel one fundamental part of this complexity. 
In Sections III and V, Strawson introduces the concept of the reactive 
attitude (or range of such attitudes). 7 The reactive attitude is non-detached, 
he says, by which he means that it occurs as part of normal human inter-
action. Let's set up an example and use it for as long as it is profitable. 
Person A bumps person B. Person C witnesses. The expectation of all 
three of these people, in keeping with normal moral attitudes, is goodwill, 
or regard, on the part of each for all of the others. When A bumps B, B 
immediately wells up with resentment, having seen no apparent reason for 
the bump. C witnessing the bump, and also seeing no obvious reason for 
it feels a sense of moral disapprobation. A, who holds the same general 
normative values, also has a feeling about the event. Strawson provides 
names for each of these types of reactions: B has a personal reactive 
attitude. C has moral reactive attitude,8 and A has a self-reflective atti-
tude. 
Strawson's reason for bringing up the reactive attitude is to demonstrate 
that human beings are profoundly involved in all manner of inter-personal 
relations. These relationships presume goodwill, or regard, on the part of 
all participants for all of the others and are essential to the coherence of 
normal human society. We constantly manifest our attitudes and actions 
in our relationships with others, and others base their reactions in a large 
part on their perceptions of our attitude at any given time. For instance, 
if A's bumping of B followed A's telling of a joke and was accompanied 
by a wink and a chuckle, B, sensing that A meant no harm, would likely 
feel no resentment at all, and might even manifest a jocular attitude, 
himself. We live in a web of such attitudes and reactions as a part of 
normal life, Strawson says. Some of the attitudes we may see manifested 
are goodwill, affection, esteem, contempt, indifference, and malevolence. 
Depending on how we view the justification of these attitudes, we may 
ourselves react with gratitude, resentment, forgiveness, love, or hurt feel-
ings (in no particular order). 
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Integral to his discussion of reactive attitudes is Strawson's treatment 
of occasions for the inhibition of the reactive attitude, which he presents 
· in the second half of Section IV and the eighth paragraph of Section V. 
He offers a hypothetical case of the manifestation of an unadjusted lack 
. of goodwill, which is reasonably met with resentment ( on the part of B) 
and disapprobation ( on the part of C). There are certain circumstances, he 
says, under which these actions are often withheld. For instance, going 
back to the case of A bumping B, A may have done so accidentally, or 
unknowingly; he could have been pushed, or perhaps he meant it as a way 
of assisting B. In. any of these cases, B would rightfully withhold resent-
ment (and C withhold disapprobation). These we may call act-exempters. 
Likewise, A may temporarily have 'not been himself', or may have been 
under great strain, or may have been acting under post-hypnotic sugges-
tion. In any of these ca~es, B may feel that A was not responsible for his 
action and so may not harbour resentment (and C would withhold disap-
probation). This is an instance of exempting the person rather than the act, 
and we may call the reason for inhibiting the reactive attitude a short-term 
person-exempter. There is another general kind of person-exempter, the 
long-term person-exempter. 9 This would justify B's withholding resent-
ment (and C's withholding disapprobation) because of A's extended ab-
normality. A could be a child, or a hopeless schizophrenic; his mind may 
have been systematically perverted, or he could have been acting under 
uncorrectable compulsive behaviour. 
To withhold the reactive attitude is to have what Strawson calls the 
objective attitude. With the objective attitude, we do not regard people in 
the normal human way, although the attitude may be emotionally toned 
with such emotions as repulsion, fear, pity, or love. We adopt the objec-
tive attitude in order to manage, handle, cure, train, or avoid, etc., another 
person. Strawson emphasizes that the objective attitude is adopted only 
under rare circumstances and that it precludes normal reactive attitudes 
and feelings. He says that although the reactive and objective attitudes are 
not mutually exclusive, they are profoundly opposed. Note that forgive-
ness as pardoning (though it looks like a withholding of blame), since it 
is counted above as itself a reactive attitude, should not be construed as 
switching to an objective attitude. 
The issue that began this discussion was whether determinism is com-
patible with free agency. Up to now, Strawson has talked about neither. 
The assumption of the pessimist, he says, is that if determinism were 
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believed to be true, the believer (B or C) would be justified in adopting 
the objective attitude and would withhold normal reactive attitudes, since 
A would not be able to be held responsible for his actions due to their -
being determined. As to the Question of Adoption, Strawson offers an-
swers at several different points. I will list summaries of them below to 
get the full range of complexity, first providing a capsule answer and its 
orientation. 
(a) negative, not a rational incumbency/possibility: 
it would not follow from the truth of determinism that anyone who 
caused an injury either was quite simply ignorant of causing it or had 
acceptably overriding reasons for acquiescing reluctantly in causing it 
or ... , etc. The prevalence of this happy state of affairs would not be a 
consequence of the reign of universal determinism, but of the reign of 
universal goodwill. 
I must admit that I am not sure exactiy what Strawson is saying here. He 
seems to be suggesting that, having introduced his three inhibitors of the 
reactive attitude, that any adoption of the objective attitude will occur only 
under circumstances of the presence of at least one of these inhibitors. If 
this assumption were to hold, 10 then for a determinist, in circumstances in 
which none of the inhibitors were operative, the adoption of the objective 
attitude would not rationally follow. From this argument, we can conclude 
that an affirmative answer to the Question of Adoption would not be a 
(rational) incumbency. I could be misinterpreting the argument, however, 
because Strawson actually says, 'we cannot find, here, the possibility' 1 of 
an affirmative answer.' 12 
(b) negative, not a rational incumbency: the only justifiable long-term 
person-exempter is 'deep-rooted psychological abnormality--or simply 
by being a child.' Since determinism does not make abnormality the 
universal condition, it cannot act as a long-term person-exempter. There 
are two possible objections to this argument. First, we could demand a 
justification for his claim of only one kind of long-term person-exempter. 
Second, suppose determinism were universally believed to be true, and all 
believers were pessimists, hence adopting the objective attitude. In such 
a case, all Bs and Cs would be compared to what Strawson identifies as 
normal conditions, abnormal. And so, in a sense, determinism would make 
abnormality the universal condition. 13 
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(c) negative , not a possibility: 'the only possible fonn of affinnative 
answer' entails detenninism making abnonnality the universal condition. 
· Although Strawson does not deny that this is possible per se, he does say 
that it is 'practically inconceivable'. I take this to mean that in some 
. possible world it might be conceivable, but not in this world . No new 
justification is offered .14 
(d) negative , not a possibility: Strawson says that regardless of one's 
belief and the validity of the theoretical ground for it, human beings are 
incapable of 'a sustained objectivity of interpersonal attitude'. The reason 
is that humans are incapable of the isolation it would entail. 15 
(e) negative, not a rational incumbency: when we adopt the objective 
attitude in the case of person-exempters, we do so only in the occurrence 
of long-tenn person-exempters (abnonnal people) and short-tenn person-
·exempters (nonnal people). In neither case is the reason a belief in deter-
minism. Therefore, 'we cannot, as we are, seriously envisage ourselves 
adopting a thoroughgoing objectivity of attitude to others as a result of 
theoretical conviction of the truth of detenninism.' 16 This, Strawson says 
is the culmination of his train of arguments. We can see from the forego-
ing arguments, that Strawson seems to be the bearer of a certain conserva-
tism ; since the nonnal situation is such that detenninism is not an inhibi-
tor, then it could never be an inhibitor. The basis of this seeming con-
servatism is Strawson's (at certain places in the article) intransigent di-
chotomy of reactive and objective attitudes. I'll bring this up for further 
discussion at the end of the paper, but suffice it for now to point out that 
if the objective and reactive attitudes could be shown to both be nonnal 
human attitudes under all conditions and could be held simultaneously, 
then detenninism would not be isolating, and therefore could be rationally 
incumbent upon the committed detenninist. 
(f) negative , not a possibility: Strawson tacks on two further points. 
The first is that 'the human commitment to ordinary inter-personal atti-
tudes ... is part of the general framework of human life, not something that 
can come up for review.' Strawson says explicitly that the real question 
is the rational incumbency of adopting the objective attitude , given a 
committed belief in detenninism . Then, he immediately counters that such 
a question is, itself , irrational , because of the reason given just now in the 
quotation .1' 
(g) negative, not a rational incumbency: The second point is that, even 
if human beings were capable of adopting a sustained objective attitude 
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(now he is entertaining the question he just said could not be entertained), 
the only (not the primary) consideration would be 'the gains and losses to 
human life, its enrichment or impoverishment.' So even if it were rational -
from the point of view of a belief in determinism to adopt the objective 
attitude, that reasoning would be trumped by the reasoning which con-
cludes that life would be too impoverished as a result. If rationality were 
the vehicle of decision-making, however, one would have to at least enter-
tain the determinist's case for adopting the objective attitude. If the adop-
tion of the objective attitude were concluded to be reasonable, and if it 
were also concluded that not adopting the objective attitude were also 
reasonable, given the reason of impoverishment of life, then a further 
criterion would have to be given for choosing the latter over the former. 
Strawson would say that the criterion is that a human life is always better 
than an inhuman life, and that the sustained objective attitude is inhu-
man.18 
(h) negative, not a rational incumbency: The above arguments were all 
given in regard to the personal reactive attitude. These next three argu-
ments extend the above rationales to the moral and self-reflective atti-
tudes. This argument is an extension of (a). Only the three inhibitors 
justify the objective attitude. A belief in determinism does not universalize 
any combination of the three inhibitors. Any talk of determinism is there-
fore irrelevant. 19 
(i) negative, not a possibility: Extension of (d).20 
U) negative, not a possibility: Reiteration of (f). Strawson says that 'it 
is not in our nature (to be able to) adopt the objective attitude indefinitely. 
On this basis, he says that it is useless to even ask the question. 21 
(k) negative, not a rational incumbency: Strawson tacks on a reiteration 
of (g), commenting, 'for those convinced that the truth of determinism ... 
really would make the one choice rational, there has always been the 
insuperable difficulty of explaining in intelligible terms how its falsity 
would make the opposite choice rational.' Here I take Strawson to be 
saying that if one accepts that determinism is an acceptable justification 
for adoption of the objective attitude, then one must also explain how it 
is that one's disbelief in determinism is adequate justification for adoption 
of the reactive attitude. Strawson seems to believe that this is a very 
strong point, but I fail to see how a belief in determinism requires one to 
justify a premise in regard to a disbelief in determinism. In fact, it is a 
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rather gross non-sequitur, unless I have misconstrued the thrust of the 
comment. 22 
This concludes my summary of Strawson's article. 
ON PRASAD 
Like Strawson, Prasad_ admits agnosticism in regard to the definition of 
'determinism'. Unlike Strawson, Prasad offers a minimal definition of 
'determinism', because, he claims, it is necessary to resolving the issue in 
question. His minimal definition is: 'when an agent does something, it is 
not possible for him to have avoided doing it or to have done something 
else.' 23 Likewise, he finds a definition of 'responsibility' also necessary, 
and offers one: 'we can call a man responsible for having done something 
if and only if we at least believe or assume that he could have done 
something else if he had chosen or wanted to and that he could have so 
chosen or wanted.' 24 Notice that his definitions make determinism and 
responsibility direct opposites: 'determinism' means no choice, and 're-
sponsibility' requires it. For the duration of this summary of Prasad's 
article, I will assume these two definitions. 
Strawson separates his article into handy sections. Since Prasad does 
not, I have taken the task on myself and have come up with thirteen 
sections, mostly according to discrete arguments. I'll address them m 
order, focusing for the most part on the arguments, themselves. 
I. Summary of Strawson and Negativist Argument 25 
According to Prasad, there is a type of moral sceptic who would assert 
that nobody can be said to be responsible for any action of his. A deter-
minist who believes that nobody is responsible for their actions is, in this 
sense, a negativist. Strawson's claim is that any definition of determinism 
is irrelevant, but if a definition of determinism results in nobody being 
responsible, this seems to figure significantly in regard to the viability of 
the reactive attitude, Prasad argues. 
Prasad picks up very quickly on Strawson's equivocation in regard to 
whether morality is possible in the face of determinism. 26 Strawson must 
come up with definitions that will reconcile these two, or be forced to 
abandon one of them. 
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11. Summary of Strawson and Preliminary Remarks 27 
No discreet arguments against Strawson. 
Ill. Futility of Blaming Determined Actions28 
Rather than feelings or attitudes, Prasad prefers to deal with the expres-
sions of attitudes and feelings. The reason for this lies in his claim that 
it is in the logic of the reactive attitude that expression of attitudes or 
feelings entail the hope and possibility of influencing the other person's 
behaviour. To paraphrase: 
Hope of influence implies belief of influence; belief of influence im-
plies belief in the possibility of influence; belief in the possibility of 
influence equals belief in an agent's ability to change. 29 
In other words, Prasad is making a similar exclusionist claim to Strawson's 
claim that only the inhibitors can justify the adoption of the objective 
attitude. Prasad is claiming that only a belief in the possibility of influenc-
ing another's actions can justify the reactive attitude. Hence, Prasad says, 
a determinist, believing that no one can influence anyone else's actions, 
would be irrational to continue the reactive attitude. However, Strawson 
claims, loudly and clearly, that there is another justification for continuing 
the reactive attitude-it is the only human thing to do. As I pointed out 
in (g), in order to resolve conflicting claims to rationality, a further cri-
terion must be chosen. Strawson would say that humanity trumps all. 
Prasad would say that adherence to the implications of determinism trumps 
all. Without a common criterion, it's left to the reader to choose. 
IV. The Logical Argument3° 
In this section, Prasad formalizes Strawson's argument for the irrelevance 
of determinism to the Question of Adoption, which we found in (a) and 
(h). Prasad offers the argument in two forms: 
(I) If any one of the three types of inhibitors exists, then it is inappro-
priate to feel or have any reactive attitude. 
It is not that if determinism is true, at least one of the three inhibi-
tors exists. 
Therefore, it is not that if determinism is true, it is inappropriate to 
feel or have any reactive attitude. 31 
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This argument is invalid, Prasad points out, because the conclusion could 
be false even if all the premises were true. 
(la) Add one premise to the above argument: 'if it is inappropriate to 
have the reactive attitude, then at least one of the three inhibitors exists.' 32 
Although this makes it a valid argument, it is still not a good argument. 
The reason, Prasad says, is that while the argument is supposed to prove 
the conclusion given in ( 1 ), the first premise of ( 1) and the added premise 
actually assume the conclusion. It remains to be proved that determinism 
is not an inhibitor or that the three types of inhibitors exhaust all inhibitors 
(determinism implying none of them). So, Strawson's mistaken assump-
tion is that determinism cannot be valid simultaneously with the existence 
of an inhibitor. 
V. Determinism and the Pragmatic Commitment33 
This section consists mainly of an elaboration of the argument given in 
Section III. Strawson emphasizes our participation in and commitment to 
inter-personal relationships. Prasad dubs this the 'pragmatic commitment'. 
Other than this nice tum of phrase, the argument contains nothing new. 
Adherence to the pragmatic commitment in the face of a belief in deter-
minism is found to be irrational because we only adhere to the pragmatic 
commitment for reasons of influencing others. Determinism obviates that, 
rendering the pragmatic commitment facile. This argument runs into the 
same rational logjam as before, with no resolution. 
VI. Self Nature and Defining Determinism 34 
Strawson makes the reasonable claim that the commitment to inter-per-
sonal relations is part of human nature, implying that any extended devi-
ance from this commitment is impossible. Prasad accepts this claim of the 
make-up of human nature and adds two of his own: by nature we feel 
W1comfortable with conceptual incompatibilities and seek to resolve them; 
by nature· we tend to have a preferred world-view. Prasad now offers the 
examples of the theist and the Hindu, two types of people who are com-
mitted to a belief in the world-view of deteminism. 
Of course, they are faced with a conceptual incompatibility: on one 
hand they are committed to determinism (which implies the suspension of 
inter-personal relations), and on the other they are committed to inter-
personal relations. Prasad draws tvr'o conclusions from this dilemma. First, 
the person must abandon the reactive attitude or reveal a complete logical 
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insensitivity. Second, a definition of determinism can no longer be put off 
by Strawson . The person is forced to choose one world-view over another, 
and the only way to do so is to engage in a thorough evaluation of each. -
A thorough evaluation necessitates, at least, a definition of determinism . 
Hence, Strawson cannot just blithely ignore it. 
The second of these conclusions seems valid to me and jibes well with 
the conclusion reached in Section I. The first conclusion seems unwar-
ranted, with Prasad assuming that the person will, after thorough evalu-
ation, choose the world-view of determinism over the world-view of human 
interaction. No justification is offered. 
VII. Duality of Human Nature35 
We saw that Strawson says that the objective attitude and the reactive 
attitude are, if not mutually exclusive, profoundly opposed . Prasad sug-
gests that we follow Hume and proposes a 'built-in duality in our nature'. 
Any lack of communion between the two sides of our nature, he says , is 
as likely to impoverish as the inhibition of all reactive attitudes . 
VIII. Equivocation of Concept of Rationality36 
In this section, Prasad takes up the issue of the incompatibility of 
rationalities that we have faced twice already in his article, in Sections III 
and V. This time, however, he offers a clever method of resolving them , 
by subdividing the rational incumbency orientation. He says that there are 
two different criteria of rationality-utility and consistency, or coherence. 
Strawson, Prasad says, asks the Question of Adoption with the second 
criterion in mind, then answers it with the first in mind. It is not unaccept -
able for Strawson to answer the question with the criterion of utility, but 
he has still left unanswered the question in regard to the criterion of 
consistency. 
Prasad has an excellent point here, but he is also assuming that the 
consistency criterion is at least as important as the utility criterion. If 
Strawson claims, as he does, that the utility criterion takes precedence · 
over all others, then Prasad needs to offer a reason that it doesn't. 
IX Calculating Gains and Losses37 
Here, Prasad adopts Strawson's argument to tum it against him. He as-
sumes the criterion of utility and extends it. Suppose, he says, one ac-
cepted that the reactive attitude is most reasonable based on the criterion 
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of utility. What if one then acquired a belief in determinism? On the 
criterion of utility, he would realize that the reactive attitude is useless in 
the sense that it could effect no changes in people. 
I think Prasad needs to take this argument one step further. Strawson 
could easily sweep this objection away simply by appeal to the criterion 
of humanity-the reactive attitude is the only human way. If Prasad could 
show with the criterion of utility that determinism would render even 
humanity hollow by showing that it is just an illusion anyway, he would 
remove Strawson's trump card. Strawson would then be forced to cling to 
an illusion, which he may very well choose to do, but this would put him 
on even thinner ice. 
X What is Human Nature? 38 
Prasad makes two important arguments in this si,ngle paragraph. Strawson 
claims that human nature requires the reactive attitude. Prasad contends 
that there is an Indian theory of human nature that claims just the oppo-
site. According to this theory, it is possible to suspend the reactive attitude 
and withdraw into oneself. 
The second argument is that, according to the'-iiame theory, not only is 
it possible, it is desirable. 
Strawson takes it as given that the reactive attitude is both necessary 
and desirable. Prasad has provided a counter-example to both. 
XI. Human Nature is Irrational39 
Prasad says that if we choose to retain reactive attitudes in the face of a 
belief in determinism for the reason that they are ingrained in our nature, 
then we admit that our nature itself is irrational. And so the high regard 
that Strawson accords our nature for being committed to inter-personal 
relations would be tainted forever by the stain of irrationality. 
This is assuming that retaining the reactive attitude in the face of de-
terminism is irrational, which Strawson is not yet compelled to admit. 
XII. Rationalizing the Reactive Attitude 40 
This is Prasad's response to Strawson's argument (k). Prasad interprets the 
"argument the same way I do and responds that the 'opposite choice' is not 
a choice at all-it is the current state of affairs-and, therefore, does not 
require justification. 
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XIII. Summary 41 
Restatement of two points: 
• 'Determinism' requires a precise definition. 
• It is an empirical claim that determinism is never an inhibitor. The 
counterexamples of the theist and the Hindu disprove the claim. 
Strawson's Response:42 In his response, Strawson graciously concedes 
two points to Prasad: (1) that Prasad's Logical Argument (Prasad, Section 
IV) effectively undermines Strawson's claim of the irrelevancy of deter-
minism, and (2) that determinism needs to be more precisely defined. 
Strawson does not concede, however, the optimist's ground . Instead, he 
offers his own minimal definition of determinism: 'every event has a 
cause'. Notice that this minimal definition differs significantly from Prasad's 
minimal definition ('when an agent does something, it is not possible for 
him to have avoided doing it, or to have done something else'). Now 
when Strawson claims that free agency is possible, we can see why Prasad 
insisted that one's definition of determinism would make such a great 
difference. 
Evaluation and Comments: Generally speaking, Strawson offers four sepa-
rate arguments to support the optimistic determinist viewpoint: 
(1) Inhibitors only (contra-objective): Only inhibitors can justify the 
objective attitude, and determinism is not an inhibitor. Therefore 
the reactive attitude is saved (since the objective attitude is not 
necessitated by determinism). See arguments (a), (e), and (h). 
(2) Humans incapable (contra-objective): By nature, humans are inca-
pable of sustaining the objective attitude for long. Therefore the 
reactive attitude is saved (as the only alternative). See arguments 
(d) and (i). 
(3) Appeal to humanity (pro-reactive): The reactive attitude is the only 
desirable attitude for reason of its superior humanity. See argu-
ments (f), (g), and (j). An offshoot of this argument is contra- 0 
objective in its claim that determinism entails universal abnormal-
ity, and is therefore inhuman. See arguments (b) and (c). 
(4) Rationalizing the reactive (contra-objective) : Anyone who supports 
the pessimistic determinist must justify the objective attitude, and 
in doing so must also justify the reactive attitude from the premise 
of the falsity of indeterminism. See argument (k). 
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We can see from this capsule summary that Strawson never really 
offers a compatibilist argument, an argument that explains how determin-
ism and free agency are compatible . Instead, he shows that they cannot be 
incompatible by demonstrating: (1) that the reactive attitude (an implica-
tion of free agency) is natural and desirable, and (2) that the objective 
attitude (an implication of determinism) is not natural, not desirable, not 
sustainable, and not compatible with the reactive attitude. 
When Prasad sets out to challenge Strawson, he concentrates his effort 
on incompatibilist arguments, showing that determinism and free agency 
are incompatible . His arguments can be grouped ~s follows: 
(I) Analytic argument (contra-reactive): By definition , determinism 
precludes free agency . See Sections I and VI. 
(2) Irrational ism (contra-reactive): Given a belief in determinism, choos-
ing the reactive attitude would be irrational. See Sections Ill, V, VI. 
An offshoot of this is the failure to respond argument (pro-objec-
tive ): Strawson raises the Question of Adoption in the logically (in 
terms of consistency) rational sense, then fails to answer it, leaving 
the irrationalism argument untouched. See VIII. 
(3) Against inhibitors only (pro-objective): The inhibitors only argu-
ment is invalid. See Section IV. 
(4) Against humanity (pro-objective): It is actually Strawson 's concep-
tion of humanity that is impoverished. See Sections VII and XI. 
(5) Argument from utility (contra-reactive): Assuming the criterion of 
utility, the reactive attitude would be useless since no influencing 
goes on. See Section IX. 
(6) Against incapability (pro-objective): It's not empirically true that 
humans are incapable of sustaining the objective attitude. See Sec-
tion X. 
(7) Against rationalizing the reactive (pro-objective): The reactive at-
titude, as normal, does not require justification . See Section XII. 
We can see that four of Prasad's seven types of arguments [(3), (4), (6), 
and (7)] are targeted directly at Strawson's four types of arguments . Ac-
cording to my evaluations of Prasad's arguments above, at least one ar-
gument of each type is successful, except for Section VII of type ( 4 ), 
which I will get to shortly. In addition to countering Strawson's argu-
ments, Prasad offers three types of his own [(l), (2), and (5)] against 
Strawson's support of the reactive attitude . Prasad does not deny that the 
reactive attitude is desirable, but he does deny that it is natural or rational 
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in the face of determinism. Prasad's least successful forays are his irra-
tionalism arguments (2) and his argument from utility (5). In these argu-
ments, he attempts to attack the desirability of the reactive attitude, but 
since Strawson always hoists the flag of humanity, the only way for 
Prasad to capture the flag is to attack the arguments from humanity. 
This is a tough nut to crack, especially since Prasad, himself, expresses 
approval at certain points. His argument in Section XI, that human nature 
is irrational, is a dismal failure because. Strawson is not compelled to 
concede the point. His argument in Section VII, the duality of human 
nature, is much more tantalizing. 
Prasad's comments on this subject are very brief, a short paragraph. All 
along, Prasad has been accepting without question two of Strawson's 
deepest presuppositions: that human nature is naturally reactive, and that 
attitudes and emotions are rational. In bringing this paper to a conclusion, 
I will comment on each of these presuppositions. 
Prasad suggests in Section VII that Strawson's conception of human 
nature is essentially dualist, that there is a reactive side and an objective 
side, and they are separated by an incommunicable gulf. Prasad then 
offers a Humean model as a richer alternative. Hume said that reason 
would be a slave to passion, that only emotions compel us to action. 
Reason is important, as well, and both must function together to get the 
most out of life.43 
The problem with bringing Hume into the picture is that he upsets the 
delicate balance of terminology that Strawson has established and Prasad 
has, until then, hewn to. Strawson has opposed the objective attitude with 
the reactive attitude, both of which are reasonable. Hume, on the other 
hand, brings in this unruly power of the unreasonable and even suggests 
that it is integral to a normal life. Throughout their articles, both philoso-
phers have shunned the irrational as categorically undesirable. 44 In fact, 
this gestalt shift in terminology is one thing that recommends Strawson's 
treatment. That doesn't exonerate him, however, from a further oversight. 
In a footnote on p. 13 of his article, Strawson nearly broaches the topic. 
He puts forth the suggestion that perhaps the more objective one's atti-
tude, the more rational the person. This tells me that he hasn't quite made 
the shift from rational/emotive to objective/reactive. In fact, he tentatively 
agrees with the suggestion and leans towards the reactive-as-emotive side 
of the dichotomy. 
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I would like to tum the reader's attention to a section of Strawson's 
paper that I have put off until now, the last paragraph of Section V (pp. 
19-20). In this paragraph, Strawson admits to the crudity of his schema 
and seeks to mitigate it by offering the complex example of parents in-
teracting with children (and psychoanalysts interacting with patients). 45 
The importance of this passage is the borderline case of parents' attitudes 
towards kids: 'parents and others concerned with the care and upbringing 
of young children cannot have to their charges either kind of attitude in 
a pure or unqualified form.' The parent must be constantly shifting back 
and forth between the objective attitude and the reactive attitude because 
the young child is alternately capable of manifesting normal human atti-
tudes and incapable. It is at this borderline that the weakness in Strawson's 
model of the human mind shows itself most clearly. If we look back at 
all the objective-attitude inhibitors, if they involve only one possible po-
tentially blameworthy agent, and if physical mishaps and well-meaning 
intentions are discounted, then the only reason for inhibiting resentment 
is a psychological incapacitation. What is a psychological incapacitation? 
Strawson doesn't say explicitly what the nature of it is, but what can it be 
other than a temporary or permanent case of irrationality? We cannot have 
normal reactive inter-personal relations with unreasonable people. In the 
case of young children, it is exactly their unreasonableness that prompts 
us to take on the objective attitude towards them and manage them. 
I submit that Strawson's schemata in which normal people are always 
reasonable is unrealistic. I cannot think of going through a single day in 
which I was completely rational at every moment, and when I witness 
other people, the same appears to be true for them. Notice Strawson's 
examples of normal reactions by offended parties or beneficiaries: grati-
tude, resentment, forgiveness, love, hurt feelings. 46 In my experience, of 
these five attitudes, only one of them is completely voluntary-forgive-
ness. This may explain why it is taken up as a worthwhile example by 
both Strawson and Prasad. The other four do not appear to me to be 
purely rational. I think that in addition to Strawson's or Hume's language, 
Sartre's language might also add a needed dimension to this discussion. 
The other four attitudes seem to me to be pre-reflective. And I think that 
very few people would disagree with the claim that for a large part of 
every person's life pre-reflective emotions arise due to habit, mood, preju-
dice, and a number of other factors that are generally taken to be non-
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rational in nature. I believe it is the rare case that one is in full rational 
command of one's attitudes and emotions. 
There is much more that can be said about this topic, and I won't -
attempt to exhaust the discussion here. I just have one more qualm to 
express, and I hope it is rational. Although I have sided with Prasad in 
most of the arguments, I find one unresolvable puzzle in his article. When 
he assumes determinism and denies free agency, how can he intelligibly 
discuss whether it would be rational or not for a person to take on the 
objective attitude or the reactive attitude? If determinism (in Prasad's 
sense) holds, there will be no cause for talk of rationality, and no amount 
of discussion will change anything. Everything would just march forward, 
inexorably. Perhaps to an outside observer (if that were possible) people 
would appear rational, but how would Prasad's article propose to change 
behaviour? I suppose it could if it led to a new deterministically rational 
decision to change to the objective mode. Prasad is insistent that Strawson 
provide a definition of determinism. I would like to see Prasad's explana-
tion of determinism such that we can intelligibly talk about rationality and 
irrationality. I think it may be possible, and I think it would be fascinating. 
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